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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANK DELANO GAY, OLIVER 
TOWNSEND & WILLIE OLEN 
SCOTT, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
8565 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from convictions of robbery in the 
Third Judicial District Court and sentences imposed 
thereon. 
Credit Industrial Loan Company in Salt Lake City, 
was held up on November 28, 1955 and $465.00 was taken 
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at gunpoint from the presence -of the assistant manager 
and the cashier on duty (R. 95-98, 116-119). On December 
3, 1955, a complaint was signed charging the appellants 
with that robbery. The appellants Townsend and Scott 
were arrested near Chandler, Oklahoma on December 4, 
1955 and returned to Salt Lake City on or about the 22nd 
day of December, 1955. The appellant Gay was arrested on 
December 20, 1955 in Los Angeles and returned in January, 
1956 to Salt Lake City. The three were bound over follow-
ing preliminary hearings and charged in two informations 
with robbery. After trial on April 10 and 11, 1956, they 
were convicted as charged and sentenced to the statutory 
prison term. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S BRIEF ABSENCE FROM 
THE BENCH WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
POINT II. 
INABILITY TO REMEMBER ACCURATELY 
THE DATE OF AN OCCURRENCE IS NOT 
PERJURY. 
POINT III. 
THE ALLEGED PRIVILEGED CONVERSA-
TIONS WERE NOT PRIVILEGED. 
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POINT IV. 
THE REFERENCES TO MONEY FROM THE 
MEMPHIS BOARD OF EDUCATION WERE 
NOT ERRONEOUS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S BRIEF· ABSENCE FROM 
THE BENCH WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
At page 75 of the record the following appears: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, would you ex-
cuse me. I believe there is a man that is wanting 
to see me and I will see if I can take care of it. You 
may proceed." 
The record then shows ten questions and answers running 
onto the following page, at which point the Court admon-
ished the witness to keep his voice up. From the amount 
of testimony taken between the two statements by the 
Court, it is certain that the Judge was gone not over two 
minutes and it could have been any shorter period. During 
that brief moment counsel for appellants were present and 
the record reflects no irregularity in the proceedings. The 
Judge did not lose control. of the trial. Consequently there 
was no prejudice to the appellants resulting from his short 
absence and they are therefore not entitled to reversal on 
this ground. Section 77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953; Tucker v. 
State (Ark. 1937), 108 S. W. 2d 890. 
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POINT II. 
INABILITY TO REMEMBER ACCURATELY 
THE DATE OF AN OCCURRENCE IS NOT 
PERJURY. 
Mr. Christensen was Assistant Manager of the vic-
timized loan company. On direct examination he testified 
that after the robbery, Detective Duncombe showed him, some 
pictures of colored persons and that he identified the three 
appellants as the stick-up men (R. 97). He was then asked 
about two lineups held for identification purposes and he 
obviously could not remember the correct date of the first 
one. At R. 99 the record shows: 
"Q. And subsequent to that time, Mr. Chris-
tensen, did you have occasion to observe a lineup? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And when was that? 
"A. That was a couple of days after the rob-
bery. I don't remember the exact date. 
"Q. You don't remember the date? 
"A. No. I believe it was about the second; no, 
it couldn't have been the second, the second day 
after. It w-as around the 18th or 20th. Well, it was 
about two days after the robbery. 
"Q. Well, this occurred on the 28th, did it not? 
"A. It was around the 30th, or something like 
that. 
"Q. So that the lineup was after, two or three 
more days after that? 
"A. Yes, uh huh." 
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Mr. Christensen's confusion was not lost on defense 
counsel. On cross-examination Mr. Hatch promptly took 
up the matter of the first lineup and returned to it to ex-
ploit the witness's uncertainty as to the date (R. 101, 106). 
Detective Duncombe testified that he showed pictures 
to Mr. Christensen a few days after the holdup and that 
Christensen picked the three appellants from the group (R. 
129). He further stated that there were no lineups of living 
persons until the afternoon of December 22, 1955, which 
is about three weeks later than the date fixed by Christen-
sen. 
Whether Christensen confused the date of the lineup 
with the date he saw the appellants' pictures, or just 
couldn't remember, is immaterial. In either event such a 
lapse of memory is normal. The accuracy of his recollec-
tion ran to his credibility, and that was a matter for the 
jury's consideration. The appellants cannot complain on 
appeal that the jury exercised its prerogative of judging 
the credibility of a witness. 
Appellants state in their brief that because of contra-
dictory testimony of the witnesses in this case it is appar-
ent that someone committed perjury. We agree with this 
analysis ~nd submit that the jury by its verdict cast the 
shadow of suspicion elsewhere than on the State's witnesses. 
POINT III. 
THE ALLEGED PRIVILEGED CONVERSA-
TIONS WERE NOT PRIVILEGED. 
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On January 28, 1956, priot: to trial of this case, the 
District Attorney was served with a "Notice of Defense of 
Alibi" (R. 11). Part of the Notice stated: 
"That on the 28th day of November, 1955, they 
were in the State of Oklahoma at the farm of the 
grandparents of Willie Olen Scott immediately out-
side the town of Meeker, Oklahoma." 
At the trial, on both direct and cross examination, appellant 
Scott testified that on November 28, 1955, he was at his 
mother's place (R. 175-178). The District Attorney asked 
Scott whether he had given his atttorneys information about 
his whereabouts on November 28, 1955, the date of the 
robbery. Assuming that the substance of any conversations 
with his attorneys on this point was privileged, the question 
was sufficiently broad that it could have been answered 
yes or no without infringing on the privilege. But the 
subject matter of the question was not privileged because 
it was not intended to be confidential. It was intended to 
be communicated to the District Attorney as part of the 
Notice of Defense of Alibi and to be advanced at the trial 
as the foundation of the appellants' defense. Consequently 
it comes within the rule that attorney-client communications 
not intended by the client to be confidential are not privi-
leged. 58 Am. J ur ., 'iVitnesses, Sec. 490 states in part: 
"However, in order that the rule as to privileged 
communications between attorney and client or its 
reason shall apply, it is necessary that the communi-
cation by the client to the attorney or his clerk be 
confidential, and be intended as confidential. The 
communication must be made in confidence for the 
purposes of the relation of attorney and client. If 
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it appears by extraneous evidence, or from the na-
ture of the transaction or communication, that con-
fidence was not contemplated and that the communi-
cation was not regarded as confidential, then testi-
mony of the attorney or client may be compelled." 
The decisions in City and County of San Francisco v. Super-
ior Court, (Calif. 1951), 231 P. 2d 26, 30; Brown v. St. 
Paul City Railway Co., (Minn. 1954), 62 N. W. 2d 688, 700, 
and Berkowitz v. Tyderko, Ltd., (Cal. App. 1936), 57 P. 
2d 173 are to the same effect. 
POINT IV. 
THE REFERENCES TO MONEY FROM THE 
MEMPHIS BOARD OF EDUCATION WERE 
NOT ERRONEOUS. 
The appellants' defense was that prior to, on the date 
of, and subsequent to the robbery charged, they were in 
Oklahoma and Tennessee. On cross examination the Dis-
trict Attorney asked appellant Scott whether, while in 
Memphis, he had visited the Board of Education with Town-
send (R. 193, 194). He answered in the negative. In cross 
examining appellant Townsend, the District Attorney asked 
whether some wrapped rolls of silver he had been carrying 
had "Memphis Board of Education" on them (R. 229). He 
answered that he had won the money gambling and didn't 
know what it had on it. The District Attorney also asked 
appellant Gay if he had visited the Board of Education 
while in Memphis (R. 245). Defense counsel moved for a 
mis-trial and the Court ruled that the question was imma-
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terial but denied the motion for mis-trial. The matter was 
then dropped. 
The purpose of these questions does not appear; the 
District Attorney could have been searching for a weakness 
in the testimony of the appellants which he was not able 
to pursue. At any rate there is nothing in the questions 
or in the answers elicited to prejudice the appellants in any 
way and the same information was testified to without 
objection by Mr. Hunter of the Oklahoma State Crime 
Bu_reau (R. 252). There was no reference to another crime 
as appellants argue in their brief, and anything of that 
nature which might have been inferred by the jury would 
have fallen far short of the affirmative statement of Mr. 
Hunter, on cross examination by defense counsel, to the 
effect that the appellants had been under surveillance and 
had been suspected of certain burglaries prior to their 
arrest for the offense charged (R. 260-262). 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellants have raised many points which we feel 
are patently without merit and which consequently are not 
discussed here. The questions they raise were questions 
for the jury. The trouble is, the jury who observed the 
appellants and their witness chose to disbelieve them and 
believed instead the witnesses for the State. Having lost 
the battle below by unanimous decision, they now seek a 
re-match. This they are not entitled to. The judgment 
below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
K. ROGER BEAN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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